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Abstract
In illiquid markets, option traders may have an incentive to increase their portfolio value
by using their impact on the dynamics of the underlying. We provide a mathematical frame-
work within which to value derivatives under market impact in a multi-player framework by
introducing strategic interactions into the Almgren & Chriss (2001) model. Specifically, we
consider a financial market model with several strategically interacting players that hold Eu-
ropean contingent claims and whose trading decisions have an impact on the price evolution of
the underlying. We establish existence and uniqueness of equilibrium results and show that the
equilibrium dynamics can be characterized in terms of a coupled system of possibly non-linear
PDEs. For the linear cost function used in Almgren & Chriss (2001), we obtain (semi) closed
form solutions for risk neutral or CARA investors. Finally, we indicate how spread crossing
costs discourage market manipulation.
Preliminary Version - Comments Welcome
AMS classification: 91B28, 91B70, 60K10
JEL classification: C73, G12, G13
Keywords: Stochastic differential games, illiquidity, market impact, derivative valuation.
1
ar
X
iv
:0
90
1.
00
91
v1
  [
q-
fin
.T
R]
  3
1 D
ec
 20
08
1 Introduction
Standard financial market models assume that asset prices follow an exogenous stochastic process
and that all transactions can be settled at the prevailing price without any impact on market
dynamics. The assumption that all trades can be carried out at exogenously given prices is
appropriate for small investors that trade only a negligible proportion of the overall daily trading
volume; it is not appropriate for institutional investors trading large blocks of shares over a short
time span. The trading decisions of institutional investors are likely to move stock prices in an
unfavorable direction and often induce significant trading costs.
It is now widely recognized that (the lack of) liquidity is a major source of financial risk
and there has been an increasing interest in mathematical models of illiquid financial markets.
Much of the literature on illiquidity focusses on either optimal hedging and portfolio liquidation
strategies for a single large investor under market impact (Cetin, Jarrow & Protter (2004), Alfonsi,
Fruth & Schied (2007), Rogers & Singh (2007)), predatory trading (Carlin, Lobo & Viswanathan
(2007), Schoeneborn & Schied (2008)) and the role of derivative securities including the problem
of market manipulation using options (Jarrow (1992), Kumar & Seppi (1992)). In an illiquid
market, derivative traders have an incentive to utilize their impact on the price dynamics of the
underlying in order move the option value in a favorable direction1. It has been shown by Jarrow
(1994), for instance, that by introducing derivatives into an otherwise complete and arbitrage-free
market, manipulation strategies with a risk free gain may appear, such as market corners and front
runs. Schoenbucher & Wilmott (2000) discuss an illiquid market model where a large trader can
influence the stock price with vanishing costs and risk. They argue that the risk of manipulation
on the part of the large trader makes the small traders unwilling to trade derivatives any more. In
particular, they predict that the option market breaks down. Our analysis indicates that markets
do not necessarily break down when stock price manipulation is costly as it is in our model.
While the aforementioned papers differ significantly in their degree of complexity, they all focus
on a single player framework. When multiple players are considered the analysis is typically con-
fined to some form of stealth trading as in Carlin, Lobo & Viswanathan (2007) and Schoeneborn
& Schied (2008), where liquidity providers try to benefit from the liquidity demand that comes
from some large investor but no strategic interaction between liquidity suppliers and consumers
is considered. In fact, so far only little work has been devoted to models with strategically in-
teracting market participants. Vanden (2005) considers a pricing game in continuous time where
the option issuer controls the volatility of the underlying but does not incur liquidity or spread
crossing costs. He derives a Nash equilibrium in the two player, risk neutral case and shows that
seemingly harmless derivatives, such as ordinary bull spreads, offer incentives for manipulation
that are identical to those offered by digital options (p. 1892, l. 36). Gallmeyer & Seppi (2000)
1Gallmeyer & Seppi (2000) provide some evidence that in illiquid markets option traders are in fact able to
increase a derivative's value by moving the price of the underlying.
2
consider a binomial model with three periods and finitely many risk neutral agents holding call
options on an illiquid underlying. Assuming a linear permanent price impact and linear transac-
tion costs, and assuming that all agents are initially endowed with the same derivative they prove
the existence of Nash equilibrium trading strategy and indicate how market manipulation can be
reduced.
We provide a general mathematical framework within which to value derivative securities in
illiquid markets under strategic interactions thereby extending the work of Gallmeyer & Seppi
(2000) in several directions. Specifically, we consider a pricing game between a finite number of
large investors (players) holding European claims written on an illiquid stock. Their goal is
to maximize expected utility at maturity from trading the stock where their portfolio value at
maturity depends on the trading strategies of all the other players, due to their impact on the
dynamics of the underlying. Following Almgren & Chriss (2001) we assume that the players have
a permanent impact on stock prices and that all trades are settled at the prevailing market price
plus a liquidity premium. The liquidity premium can be viewed as an instantaneous price impact
that affects transaction prices but not the value of the players' inventory. This form of market
impact modeling is analytically more tractable than that of Obizhaeva & Wang (2006) which
also allows for temporary price impacts and resilience effects. It has also been adopted by, e.g.,
Carlin, Lobo & Viswanathan (2007), Schoeneborn & Schied (2008) and many practitioners from
the financial industry.
Our framework is flexible enough to allow for rather general liquidity costs including the linear
cost function of Almgren & Chriss (2001) and some form of spread crossing costs. We show
that when the market participants are risk neutral or have CARA utility functions the pricing
game has a unique Nash equilibrium in the class of absolutely continuous trading strategies;
existence results for more general utility functions are given for the one player case. We solve
the problem of equilibrium pricing using techniques from the theory of stochastic optimal control
and stochastic differential games. We show that the family of the players' value functions can
be characterized as the solution to a coupled system of non-linear PDEs. Here we use a-priori
estimates for Nash equilibria; we prove that the system of PDEs has a unique classical solution
with bounded derivatives. It turns out that the equilibrium problem can be solved in closed form
for a specific market environment, namely the linear cost structure used in Almgren & Chriss
(2001) and risk neutral agents. We use this explicit solutions to state some conditions which make
manipulation unattractive or avoid it altogether. For instance, we show that when the agents
are risk neutral no market manipulation occurs in zero sum games, i.e., in a game between an
option writer and an option issuer. Furthermore, we find that the bid ask spread is important
determinant of market manipulation. It turns out that the higher the spread, the less beneficial
market manipulation: high spread crossing costs make trading more costly and hence discourage
frequent re-balancing of portfolio positions.
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This paper is organized as follows: We present the market model in section 2. In chapter 3,
we formulate the optimization problem, derive a priori estimates for Nash equilibria and prove the
existence of a solution for one player with general utility function. We solve the multi-player case
in section 4 for risk neutral and CARA agents. We use these solutions in chapter 5 to show how
market manipulation can be reduced. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
We adopt the market impact model of Schoeneborn & Schied (2007) with a finite set J of agents,
or players, trading a single stock whose price process depends on the agent's trading strategies.
Following Almgren & Chriss (2001) we shall assume that the players have a permanent impact on
asset prices and that all trades are settled at prevailing market prices plus a liquidity premium
which depends on the change in the players' portfolios. In order to be able to capture changes
in portfolio positions in an analytically tractable way, we follow Almgren & Chriss (2001) and
Schoeneborn & Schied (2007) and restrict ourselves to absolutely continuous trading strategies.
Hence we consider only trading strategies from the class
X , {X : [0, T ] 7→ R|X absolutely continuous, adapted and X0 = 0}
where we denote by Xjt the number of stock shares held by player j ∈ J , {1, ..., N} at time
t ∈ [0, T ]. We write dXjt = X˙jt dt and call X˙j the trading speed of the player j.
2.1 Price dynamics and the liquidity premium
Our focus is on valuation schemes for derivatives with short maturities under strategic market
interactions. For short trading periods it is appropriate to model the fundamental stock price, i.e.,
the value of the stock in the absence of any market impact, as a Brownian Motion with volatility
(σBt). Market impact is accounted for by assuming that the investors' accumulated stock holdings∑N
i=1X
i have a linear impact on the stock process (Pt) so that
Pt = P0 + σBt + λ
N∑
i=1
Xit (2.1)
with a permanent impact parameter λ > 0. The linear permanent impact is consistent with the
work of Huberman & Stanzl (2004) who argued that linearity of the permanent price impact is
important to exclude quasi-arbitrage2.
2There is some empirical evidence that very large trades have a concave price impact but this observation needs
further validation.
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A trade at time t ∈ [0, T ] is settled at a transaction price P˜t that includes an additional
instantaneous price impact, or liquidity premium. Specifically,
P˜t = Pt + g
(
N∑
i=1
X˙it
)
(2.2)
with a cost function g that depends on the instantaneous change
∑N
i=1 X˙
i in the agents' position
in a possibly non-linear manner. The liquidity premium accounts for limited available liquidity,
transaction costs, fees, spread crossing costs, etc. Spread-crossing costs are of particular impor-
tance and have not been considered in the previous literature on market impact.
Remark 2.1. In our model the liquidity costs are the same for all traders and depend only on the
aggregate demand throughout the entire set of agents. This captures situations where the agents
trade through a market maker or clearing house that reduces the trading costs by collecting all orders
and matching incoming demand and supply prior to settling the outstanding balance
∑N
i=1 X˙
i
t at
market prices. 
We assume with no loss of generality that g is normalized, i.e., g(0) = 0 and smooth. The
following additional mild assumptions on g will guarantee that the equilibrium pricing problem
has a solution for risk neutral and CARA investors.
Assumption 2.2. • The derivative g′ is bounded away from zero, that is g′ > ε > 0.
• The mapping z 7→ g(z) + zg′(z) is strictly increasing.
The first condition is natural for a cost function. Since the liquidity costs associated with a net
change in the overall position z is given by zg(z), the second assumption states that the agents
face increasing marginal costs of trading. Our assumptions on g are satisfied for the following
important examples:
Example 2.3. Cost functions which satisfy Assumption 2.2 are the linear cost function g(z) = κz
with κ > 0, used in Almgren & Chriss (2001) and cost functions of the form
g(z) = κz + s
2
pi
arctan(Cz) with s, C > 0.
The former is the cost function associated with a block-shaped limit order book. The latter can
be viewed as a smooth approximation of the map z 7→ κz + s · sign(z) which is the cost function
associated with a block-shaped limit order book and spread s > 0.
2.2 Preferences and endowments
Each agent is initially endowed with a contingent claim Hj = Hj(PT ), whose payoff depends on
the stock price PT at maturity. Although it is not always necessary we assume that the functions
Hj are smooth and bounded with bounded derivatives Hjp .
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Remark 2.4. We only consider options with cash delivery. The assumption of cash delivery is
key. While cash settlement is susceptible to market manipulation, we show in Section 5 below
that when deals are settled physically, i.e., when the option issuer delivers the underlying, market
manipulation is not beneficial: the cost of acquiring at an increased price outweighs the benefits
from a possible higher option payoff, due to an increase in the underlying. 
We model the risk preference of the agent j ∈ J with a von Neumann - Morgenstern utility
function uj and assume that her aim is to maximize her expected portfolio value at maturity from
trading in the financial market so the agent's optimization problem is given by:
sup
Xj∈X
E
[
uj
(
−
∫ T
0
X˙jt P˜tdt+H
j(PT ) + valuej(X
j
T )
)]
. (2.3)
The portfolio value consists of the trading costs − ∫ T0 X˙jt P˜tdt, the option payoff Hj(PT ) and
the liquidation value valuej(XjT ) of X
j
T stock shares at maturity. Rigorously defining a form
of liquidation value in a multi-player framework is a question of its own mathematical interest,
and is not the focus of this paper. The problem of defining a liquidation value in a single-player
framework has been solved in a recent paper by Schoeneborn & Schied (2008); in a game-theoretic
setting the problem is much more involved. The agents optimize against their beliefs about the
other players' individual assessments of their respective portfolio values. In order to simplify the
analysis we work under Assumption 2.5 below.
Assumption 2.5. All agents optimize their utility assuming that
valuej(XjT ) =
∫ T
0
X˙jt Ptdt. (2.4)
The preceding assumption is motivated by the single player, risk-neutral framework where (2.4)
holds in expected values. In such a setting it states that the expected costs (utility) of building
up a portfolio over the time span [0, T ] under market impact equals the expected liquidation
costs (utility) under infinitely slow liquidation. In a multi-player model Assumption 2.5 is only
a first benchmark that simplifies the subsequent analysis even if all player are risk-neutral. The
assumption is nonetheless useful as it allows us to carry out our analysis of equilibrium and to
derive some insight into the structure of market dynamics under strategic interactions.
Under Assumption 2.5 the individual optimization problem (2.3) reduces to
sup
Xj∈X
E
[
uj
(
−
∫ T
0
X˙jt g
(
N∑
i=1
X˙it
)
dt+Hj(PT )
)]
. (2.5)
We say that a vector of strategies
(
X˙1, ..., X˙N
)
is a Nash equilibrium if for each agent j ∈ J
her trading strategy Xj is a best response against the behavior of all the other players, i.e., if
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Xj solves (2.5), given the vector X−j , (Xi)i 6=j . In the following section we derive a-priori
estimates for equilibrium trading strategies and use standard results from the theory of stochastic
optimization to show that Nash equilibria can be characterized in terms of a coupled system of
partial differential equations (PDEs). For the special case of risk neutral and CARA investors
we show that the system of PDEs has a solution so that a unique (in a certain class) equilibrium
exists.
3 Equilibrium Dynamics and A-Priori Estimates
In this section we formulate the optimization problem (2.5) as a stochastic control problem, derive
the associated Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman-equations, HJB for short, and transform it into a system
of coupled PDEs. To this end, we choose the stock price P and the trading costs Rj of the agent
j ∈ J as state variables. They evolve according to:
dPt = σdBt + λ
N∑
i=1
X˙itdt, P0 = p0 (3.1)
dRjt = X˙
j
t g
(
N∑
i=1
X˙it
)
dt, Rj0 = 0. (3.2)
For a given time t < T , spot price p and trading costs r the value function of the player j, defined
by
V j(t, p, r) , sup
Xj∈X
Et
[
uj
(
−rj −
∫ T
t
X˙jsg
(
N∑
i=1
X˙is
)
ds+Hj(PT )
)
| Pt = p
]
, (3.3)
denotes the maximal expected portfolio value at maturity that the player can achieve by trading
the underlying. The associated HJB-equation is
0 = vjt +
1
2
σ2vjpp + sup
cj
[
λ
(
cj + X˙−j
)
vjp + c
jg
(
cj + X˙−j
)
vj
rj
]
vj(T, p, r) = uj
(−rj +Hj(p)) (3.4)
cf. Fleming & Soner (1993). Here we have used vj
ri
≡ 0 for i 6= j. Given the trading strategies
X−j of all the other agents, a candidate for the maximizer cj = X˙j should satisfy
0 = λ
vjp
vj
rj
+ g
(
cj + X˙−j
)
+ cjg′
(
cj + X˙−j
)
(3.5)
provided vj
rj
6= 0. We sum up these equations over the set of players in order to get the following
characterization for the cumulated equilibrium trading speed
∑N
i=1 X˙
i
t :
0 = λ
N∑
i=1
vip
vi
ri
+Ng
(
N∑
i=1
X˙it
)
+
(
N∑
i=1
X˙it
)
g′
(
N∑
i=1
X˙it
)
. (3.6)
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Due to Assumption 2.2, z 7→ Ng(z) + zg′(z) is strictly increasing. Hence, equation (3.6) admits a
unique solution X˙∗ = X˙∗
(∑N
i=1
vip
vi
ri
)
. Plugging this solution back into (3.5) allows to compute
the optimal strategy cj = X˙j in terms of vip and v
i
ri
as
cj = X˙j = − 1
g′
(
X˙∗
) [λ vjp
vj
rj
+ g(X˙∗)
]
. (3.7)
This expression is well defined if vj
rj
6= 0 because g′ > 0. To conclude, we have turned the family
of individual HJB-equations (3.4) into the following system of coupled PDEs for j = 1, ..., N : 0 = v
j
t +
1
2
σ2vjpp + λX˙
∗vjp + X˙
jg
(
X˙∗
)
vj
rj
vj(T, p, r) = uj
(−rj +Hj(p)) (3.8)
where the coupling stems from the aggregate trading speed X˙∗ = X˙∗
(∑N
i=1
vip
vi
ri
)
.
Solving the system (3.8) is delicate, to say the least. The problem is the non-linearity coming
from the expression X˙jg
(
X˙∗
)
along with the implicit dependence of X˙j on the derivatives vip
and vi
ri
and the fact that vi
ri
appears in the denominator. The latter problem can be coped with
by assuming that (after a possible monotone transformation) the agents' risk preferences satisfy
a translation property so that ur = 1. A large class of such utility functions can be linked to
backward stochastic differential equations but we choose not to embed our work into that line of
research. We consider instead the case of risk neutral and CARA investors where the existence
of a unique classical solution to the system (3.8) is guaranteed without any reference to backward
equations. The proof uses the following a-priori estimates for the optimal trading strategies. It
states that in equilibrium the trading speed is bounded. As a result, the agents' utilities from
trading and the value function associated with their respective HJB equations along with (as we
shall see) their derivatives are bounded.
Lemma 3.1. Let
(
X˙1, ..., X˙N
)
be a Nash equilibrium for problem (2.5). Then each strategy X˙j
satisfies ∣∣∣X˙j∣∣∣ ≤ N λ
ε
max
i
∥∥H ip∥∥∞ .
Proof. Let j ∈ J , h , maxi
∥∥H ip∥∥∞ and A , {∑Ni=1 X˙i ≥ 0} be the set where the aggregate
trading speed is nonnegative. Let us fix the sum of the competitors' strategies X˙−j . On the
set A the best response X˙j is bounded above by K , λεh. Otherwise the truncated strategy
Y˙ j , X˙j ∧ λεh would outperform X˙j . To see this, let us compare the payoffs associated with X˙j
and Y˙ j . The payoff associated with X minus the payoff associated with Y can estimated from
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below as
−
∫ T
0
Y˙ jg
(
Y˙ j + X˙−j
)
dt+Hj(PT (Y j))
+
∫ T
0
X˙jg
(
X˙j + X˙−j
)
dt−Hj(PT (Xj))
≥
∫ T
0
Y˙ j
(
g
(
X˙j + X˙−j
)
− g
(
Y˙ j + X˙−j
))
+
(
X˙j − Y˙ j
)
g
(
X˙j + X˙−j
)
dt− λ(XjT − Y jT ) ‖Hp‖∞ .
Note that X˙j + X˙−j ≥ 0 on A and thus g
(
X˙j + X˙−j
)
≥ 0 due to Assumption 2.2. Furthermore,
g
(
X˙j + X˙−j
)
− g
(
Y˙ j + X˙−j
)
≥ ε
(
X˙j − Y˙ j
)
, again by Assumption 2.2. The difference in the
payoffs is therefore strictly bigger than∫ T
0
Y˙ jε
(
X˙j − Y˙ j
)
dt− λh
∫ T
0
X˙j − Y˙ jdt
≥
∫
X˙j>Y˙ j
(
εY˙ j − λh
)(
X˙j − Y˙ j
)
dt
= 0.
This shows that X˙j is bounded above on the set A. A symmetric argument shows that on the
complement Ac the optimal response is bounded below by −K. Furthermore, this implies that on
Ac the optimal response is bounded above by
X˙j =
N∑
i=1
X˙i +
∑
i 6=j
−X˙i ≤ 0 + (N − 1)K
A similar argument yields that X˙j is bounded below on A. This completes the proof.
Remark 3.2. These a priori estimates, together with the boundedness assumption on the payoffs
Hj, imply that the optimization problem (2.5) is bounded. Moreover, if a smooth solution to the
PDE system (3.8) exists, it is bounded. 
In the one player framework we can use a standard result from the theory of stochastic control
to show that (3.8) admits a unique solution.
Proposition 3.3. Let N = 1 and for the terminal condition ψ(p, r) , u(−r + H(p)) let ψ ∈ C 3
and let ψ,ψp, ψr satisfy a polynomial growth condition. Then the Cauchy problem (3.8) admits a
unique classical solution in C 1,2, which coincides with the value function V .
Proof. Due to Lemma (3.1), the optimal control X˙ can be chosen from a compact set. Thus, we
can apply Theorem IV.4.3 in Fleming & Soner (1993), which yields that (3.8) admits a unique
solution in C 1,2, which is of polynomial growth. It remains to apply the Verification Theorem
IV.3.1 from Fleming & Soner (1993) to see that this solution coincides with the agent's value
function V .
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4 Examples
In this section we establish existence and uniqueness of equilibrium results for risk neutral and
CARA investors. For risk neutral investors and linear cost functions the equilibrium strategies can
be given in closed form; if spread crossing costs are involved a closed form solution is not available
and we report numerical results instead.
4.1 Risk Neutral Agents
Let us assume that all players are risk neutral, i.e. uj(z) = z. In a first step we prove existence of
a unique solution to the system (3.8) for general cost functions g. Subsequently we construct an
explicit solution to (3.8) for the linear cost structure used in Algmen & Chriss (2001).
4.1.1 General Cost Structure
Let g be a general cost function which satisfies Assumption 2.2. In the risk neutral case the value
function of player j turns into
V j(t, p, r) = −rj + sup
Xj∈X
Et
[
−
∫ T
t
X˙jsg
(
N∑
i=1
X˙is
)
ds+Hj(PT )|Pt = p
]
.
In particular, V j
rj
≡ −1 so the optimal strategies do not depend on the trading costs. In other
words, the state variable r is redundant and we omit it in this section. We write
V j(t, p) , V j(t, p, 0).
The HJB-equation (3.4) turns into
0 = vjt +
1
2
σ2vjpp + sup
cj
[
λ
(
cj + X˙−j
)
vjp − cjg
(
cj + X˙−j
)]
(4.1)
where we have used vj
rj
= −1. The optimal trading speed form (3.7) is given by
cj = X˙j = − 1
g′
(
X˙∗
) [−λvjp + g(X˙∗)] (4.2)
where the aggregate trading speed X˙∗ =
∑N
i=1 X˙
j is the unique solution to
0 = λ
N∑
i=1
vip −Ng
(
N∑
i=1
X˙it
)
−
(
N∑
i=1
X˙it
)
g′
(
N∑
i=1
X˙it
)
. (4.3)
The system of PDEs (3.8) therefore takes the form
0 = vjt +
1
2
σ2vjpp + λX˙
∗vjp − X˙jg
(
X˙∗
)
(4.4)
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with terminal condition vj(T, p) = Hj(p). The following proposition shows that a unique solution
exists if H ∈ C 2b , i.e. H and its derivatives up to order 2 are bounded. The proof follows from a
general existence result stated in Appendix A.
Proposition 4.1. Let H ∈ C 2b . Then the Cauchy problem (4.4) admits a unique classical solution
in C 1,2, which coincides with the vector of value functions.
An alternative way of solving the system (4.4) is the following: If we sum up the N equations,
we get a Cauchy problem for the aggregate value function v ,
∑N
i=1 v
i, namely
0 = vt +
1
2
σ2vpp + X˙∗
[
λvp − g
(
X˙∗
)]
with terminal condition v(T, p) =
∑N
i=1H
i(p). Existence and uniqueness of a solution to this
one-dimensional problem can be shown using Theorem IV.8.1 in Ladyzenskaja (1968). Once the
solution is known, we can plug it back into (4.4) and get N decoupled equations. This technique
is applied in the following section where we construct an explicit solution for linear cost functions.
4.1.2 Linear Cost Structure
For the particular choice g(z) = κz (κ > 0) used in Algmren & Chriss (2001) and Schoeneborn &
Schied (2007), the solution to (4.4) can be given explicitly.
Corollary 4.2. Let g(z) = κz. Then the solution of (4.4) can be given in closed form as the
solution to a nonhomogeneous heat equation.
Proof. The optimal trading speed from (4.2) and the aggregate trading speed from (4.3) are
X˙j =
λ
κ
(
vjp −
1
N + 1
N∑
i=1
vip
)
(4.5)
X˙∗ =
N∑
i=1
X˙i =
λ
κ(N + 1)
N∑
i=1
vip =
λ
κ(N + 1)
vp. (4.6)
Let us sum up the N equations from (4.4). This yields the following PDE for the aggregate value
function v =
∑N
i=1 v
i:
0 = vt +
1
2
σ2vpp +
λ2N
κ(N + 1)2
v2p (4.7)
with terminal condition v(T, p) =
∑N
i=1H
i(p). This PDE is a variant of Burgers' equation, cf.
Rosencrans (1972). It allows for an explicit solution, which we cite in Lemma 4.3. With this
solution at hand, we can solve for each single investor's value function. We plug the solution v
back into the equations (4.5) and (4.6) for the trading speeds, and those into the PDE (4.4). This
yields
0 = vjt +
1
2
σ2vjpp +
λ2
κ(N + 1)2
v2p
11
with terminal condition vj(T, p) = Hj(p). This nonhomogeneous heat equation is solved by
vj(T − t, p) =
∫
R
HjdN (p, σt) +
λ2
κ(N + 1)2
∫ t
0
∫
R
v2p(s, ·)dN (p, σ(t− s))
where v is given in Lemma 4.3 and N denotes the heat kernel.
In the preceding proof and in Corollary 4.5 we need the solution to a variant of Burgers'
equation. We cite it in the following Lemma.
Lemma 4.3. Let A > 0, B 6= 0. The PDE
0 = 2vt +Avpp +Bv2p
with terminal value
v(T, p) = G(p)
is solved by
v(t, p) =
A
B
log
[∫
R
exp
(
B
A
G
(√
Az
))
dN
(
p√
A
, T − t
)]
.
Proof. By means of a linear transformation we can reduce the problem to A = B = 1. This
particular case is solved in Rosencrans (1972).
4.1.3 Numerical Illustrations
In the risk neutral setting, we were able to reduce the system of PDEs from the multi-player setting
to the one-dimensional PDE (4.7) for the aggregate value function. This can be interpreted as the
value function of the representative agent. Such reduction to a representative agent is not always
possible for more general utility functions. In the sequel we illustrate the optimal trading speed
X˙(t, p) and surplus3 of a representative agent as functions of time and spot prices for a European
call options H(PT ) = (PT −K)+ and digital option H(PT ) = 1{PT≥K}, respectively. We choose
a linear cost function, strike K = 100, maturity T = 1, volatility σ = 1 and liquidity parameters
λ = κ = 0.01. We see from Figure 1 that for the case of a call option both the optimal trading
speed and the surplus increases with the spot; the latter also increases with the time to maturity.
Furthermore, the increase in the trading speed if maximal, when the option is at the money. For
digital options the trading speed is highest for at the money options close to maturity as the trader
tries to push the sport above the strike. If the spot is far away from the strike, the trading speed
is very small as it is unlikely that the trader can push the sport above the strike before expiry.
3By surplus we difference between the representative agent's optimal expected utility v(t, p) and the conditional
expected payoff Et[H(PT )|Pt = p] in the absence of any market impact.
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Figure 1: Trading speed and surplus for a risk neutral investor holding a European Call option.
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Figure 2: Trading speed and surplus for a risk neutral investor holding a Digital option.
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Figure 3: Trading speed and surplus for a risk neutral investor holding a European Call option for different
spread sizes s = 0 (black), 0.001 (blue), 0.002 (red), 0.003 (green), 0.004 (brown). The higher the spread,
the smaller the trading speed and the surplus.
Figures 3 and 4 illustrate that a high spread makes manipulation unattractive. It shows the
optimal trading speed and the surplus at time t = 0 for the Call and Digital option in the one
player framework. We used the cost function
g(z) = κz + s · sign(z) for different spreads s ∈ {0, 0.001, 0.002, 0.003, 0.004}
with the remaining parameters as above. We see that the higher the spread, the smaller the
trading speed and the surplus. This is intuitive as frequent trading, in particular, when the option
is at the money, incurs high spread crossing costs. The same is true for fixed transaction costs
which also discourage frequent trading.
4.2 Risk Averse Agents
A second class which yields explicit results is those of exponential utility functions uj(z) =
− exp (−αjz) for j = 1, ..., N , where αj > 0 is the risk aversion coefficient. In this case the
value functions satisfy
V j(t, p, r) = exp
(
αjrj
) · V j(t, p, 0)
and thus V j
rj
= αjV j . We suppress the state variable r and write V j(t, p) , V j(t, p, 0). As above,
we first show existence and uniqueness of a solution for a general cost structure. In a second step,
we derive the closed form solution for the linear cost function in the single player framework.
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Figure 4: Trading speed and surplus for a risk neutral investor holding a Digital option for different spread
sizes s = 0 (black), 0.001 (blue), 0.002 (red), 0.003 (green), 0.004 (brown). The higher the spread, the
smaller the trading speed and the surplus.
4.2.1 General Cost Structure
The HJB-equation (3.4) turns into
0 = vjt +
1
2
σ2vjpp + sup
cj
[
λ
(
cj + X˙−j
)
vjp + c
jg
(
cj + X˙−j
)
αjvj
]
(4.8)
with terminal condition vj(T, p) = − exp (−αjHj(p)). We apply the linear transformation v˜j ,
− 1
αj
log(−vj) to turn the HJB equation into
0 = v˜jt +
1
2
σ2v˜jpp −
1
2
σ2αj
(
v˜jp
)2 + sup
cj
[
λ
(
cj + X˙−j
)
v˜jp − cjg
(
cj + X˙−j
)]
(4.9)
with terminal condition v˜j(T, p) = Hj(p). Note that this equation equals the HJB-equation (4.1)
in the risk neutral setting, up to the quadratic term −12σ2αj
(
v˜jp
)2
. As in (4.2), the optimal
trading speeds are
cj = X˙j = − 1
g′
(
X˙∗
) [−λv˜jp + g(X˙∗)] (4.10)
where the aggregate trading speed X˙∗ is the unique solution to
0 = λ
N∑
i=1
v˜ip −Ng
(
N∑
i=1
X˙it
)
−
(
N∑
i=1
X˙it
)
g′
(
N∑
i=1
X˙it
)
. (4.11)
If we plug X˙∗ and X˙j back into (4.9), we get
0 = v˜jt +
1
2
σ2v˜jpp −
1
2
σ2αj
(
v˜jp
)2 + λX˙∗vjp − X˙jg (X˙∗) . (4.12)
We can show existence and uniqueness of a solution.
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Proposition 4.4. Let Hj ∈ C 2b for each j ∈ J . The Cauchy problem 4.9 admits a unique solution,
which coincides with the vector of value functions (up to an exponential transformation).
Proof. See appendix A.
4.2.2 Linear Cost Structure, Single Player
For the one player case with linear cost structure, we have an explicit solution:
Corollary 4.5. Let N = 1 and g(z) = κz. Then the Cauchy problem 4.9 admits a unique solution,
which can be given in closed form.
Proof. The maximizer in (4.9) is
c = X˙ =
λ
2κ
v˜p
and the Cauchy problem (4.12) turns into
0 = v˜t +
1
2
σ2v˜pp +
(
λ2
4κ
− 1
2
σ2α
)
v˜2p
with terminal condition v(T, p) = H(p). This is Burgers' equation. Its explicit solution is given
in Lemma 4.3.
4.2.3 Numerical Illustrations
Let us conclude this section with numerical illustrations. We simulated the system (4.8) for two
players. Figure 5 shows the aggregate optimal trading speed X˙(0, p) + Y˙ (0, p) and the surpluses
vj(0, p) − E [uj (H(PT )) |P0 = p] for time t = 0 and different spot prices p ∈ [95, 105] for the
European Call option H(PT ) = (PT −K)+; we assume that Player 1 (blue) is the option writer
and Player 2 (red) the option issuer. We chose the strike K = 100, maturity T = 1, volatility
σ = 2 and liquidity parameters λ = κ = 0.01 and risk aversion parameters α1 = 0.01, α2 = 0.01
(plain), respectively, α1 = 0.001, α2 = 0.1 (dashed). Since Player 1 has a long position in the
option, she has an incentive to buy the underlying; for the same reason Players 2 has an incentive
to sell it (Panel (b)). Our simulations suggest that the dependence of the equilibrium trading
speed on the agents' risk aversion is weak (Panels (b) and (c)) and that overall the option issuer
is slightly more active than the option writer. Furthermore, we see from Panel (d) that the issuer
benefits more from reducing her loss than the writer benefits from increasing her gains. This effect
is due to the concavity of the utility function and increases with the risk aversion.
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Figure 5: Value function, trading speed, aggregate trading speed and surplus for the writer (blue) and
issuer (red) of a European Call option when both agents are risk averse. The plain (dashed) curves display
the case where issuer is about as (more) risk averse than the option writer.
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5 How to Avoid Manipulation
In this section, we use the closed form solutions for risk neutral agents derived in subsection 4.1.2
to illustrate how an option issuer may prevent other market participants from trading against her
by using their impact on the dynamics of the underlying. Some of our observations were already
made in Gallmeyer & Seppi (2000) in a three-period binomial model. We start with the simplest
case of a zero-sum game.
Corollary 5.1. Let all players be risk neutral with offsetting payoffs
∑N
i=1H
i = 0. Then the
aggregate trading speed is
∑N
i=1 X˙
i ≡ 0.
Proof. If
∑N
i=1H
i = 0 then (4.6) and (4.7) imply that the aggregate value function v =
∑N
i=1 v
i
equals zero. It follows from (4.6) that the aggregate trading speed vanishes.
Loosely speaking in a zero-sum game, if all option traders are risk neutral and willing to move
the market in their favor, their combined effect cancels. We note that this is no longer true for
general utility functions, as illustrated in figure 5. Of course, in reality market manipulation is
illegal and many investors are unable to manipulate the underlying in the first place. This is why
we now look at the following asymmetric situation: The option issuer, Player 0, does not trade the
underlying; her competitor, Player 1, owns the derivative H1 6= 0 and intends to move the stock
price to her favor. In addition, there are N − 1 informed investors without option endowment
in the market. They are predators that may supply liquidity and thus reduce the first player's
market impact, cf. Carlin, Lobo & Viswanathan (2007) and Schoeneborn & Schied (2007). We
find that the more informed competitors are active, the less aggregate manipulation will occur.
Corollary 5.2. Let H1 6= 0 and H i = 0 for i = 2, ..., N . Then limN→∞
∑N
i=1 X˙
i
t = 0.
Proof. The solution v to the Cauchy problem (4.7) with terminal condition
v(T, p) =
N∑
i=1
H i(p) = H1(p)
is bounded uniformly in N . Equation (4.6) yields
N∑
i=1
X˙i =
λ
κ
1
N + 1
vp
N→∞→ 0.
Let us modify the preceding setting a little. Again, Player 0 issues a product H and does not
intend to manipulate the underlying, while her competitors do. More precisely, assume that player
0 splits the product H into pieces and sells them to N risk neutral competitors, such that each of
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Figure 6: Aggregate trading speed X˙∗ at time t = 0 for N = 1 (black), 10 (blue), 100 (red) players each
holding 1/N shares of a Call (left) and Digital (right) option with strike K = 100. The more agents, the
less aggregate manipulation.
them gets 1NH. We find that their aggregate trading speed
∑N
i=1 X˙
i is decreasing in the number
of competitors N . Consequently, the option issuer should sell her product to as many investors as
possible in order to avoid being outsmarted. We illustrate this result in figure 6, which shows the
aggregate trading speed at time t = 0 of N players each holding 1/N option shares.
Corollary 5.3. Let H i = 1NH for i = 1, ..., N . Then for each t ∈ (0, T ] the aggregate trading
speed
∑N
i=1 X˙
i
t is decreasing in N and limN→∞
∑N
i=1 X˙
i
t = 0.
Proof. As in the preceding corollary, the assertion follows from equations (4.7) and (4.6).
The preceding results indicate how an option issuer can prevent her competitors from manip-
ulation. One strategy is public announcement of the transaction: the more informed liquidity
suppliers on the market, the smaller the impact on the underlying. A second strategy is split-
ting the product into pieces; the more option writers, the less manipulation. Let us conclude this
section with a surprisingly simple way to avoid manipulation: using options with physical delivery.
Remark 5.4. Calls, Puts and Forwards with physical delivery do not induce stock price manipu-
lation. 
Proof. Consider a risk neutral agent who owns Θ > 0 Call options with physical delivery and
strike K. As above, we denote by X her strategy in the underlying. At maturity, she exercises
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0 ≤ θ ≤ Θ of her Call options. Problem (2.5) turns into:
sup
X∈X,θ≤Θ
E
[∫ T
0
−X˙t(Pt + κX˙t)dt+ (XT + θ)
(
PT − 12λ(XT + θ)
)
− θK
]
= sup
X∈X,θ≤Θ
E
[∫ T
0
−κX˙2t dt+ θ
(
PT − 12λθ
)
− θK
]
= sup
X∈X
E
[∫ T
0
−κX˙2t dt
]
+ sup
θ≤Θ
[
θ
(
PT − 12λθ
)
− θK
]
= sup
θ≤Θ
[
θ
(
PT − 12λθ
)
− θK
]
where the first term in the first line describes the expected trading costs in [0, T ] and the liquidation
value of θ+XT stock shares at maturity. The optimal trading strategy is X ≡ 0. The same holds
true for Put options and Forward options with physical delivery.
6 Conclusion
We investigated the strategic behavior of option holders in illiquid markets. If trading the under-
lying has a permanent impact on the stock price, the possession of derivatives with cash delivery
may induce market manipulation. We showed the existence and uniqueness of optimal trading
strategies in continuous time and for a general cost function; in the one player framework for
general utility functions, and in the multi-player case for risk neutral as well as CARA investors.
Moreover, we showed how market manipulation can be reduced.
Our work may be extended in several directions. Foremost, we derived our results under
Assumption 2.5. This assumption is only satisfied in the single-player risk-neutral case where the
expected costs of buying a portfolio over a finite time interval under market impact equals its
expected liquidation value under infinitely slow liquidation and does not hold in general. The
problem of defining a proper notion of liquidation value under strategic interaction is important
but was not our focus and is left for future research. Furthermore, it would be interesting to
consider American or path-dependent options as well as more sophisticated market impact models
such as Obizhaeva & Wang (2006) that account for resilience effects and temporary price impacts.
A An Existence Result
In this section, we prove Propositions 4.1 and 4.4 where the PDE (4.4) in the risk neutral setting
is a special case of the system (4.9) for risk averse agents, with αj = 0 for each j. In order to
establish our existence and uniqueness of equilibrium result, we adopt the proof of Proposition
15.1.1 in Taylor (1997) to our framework. After time inversion from t to T − t both systems of
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PDEs are of the form
vt = Lv + F (vp) (A.1)
for v ,
(
v1, ..., vN
)
, where L is the Laplace-operator
L =
1
2
σ2
∂2
∂p2
and F =
(
F 1, ..., FN
)
is of the form
F j(vp) = −12σ
2αj
(
vjp
)2 + λX˙∗vjp − X˙jg (X˙∗) .
Here X˙∗ and X˙j are given implicitly by (4.2) and (4.3). The initial condition is
v(0, p) = H(p) =
(
H1, ...,HN
)
. (A.2)
We rewrite (A.1) in terms of an integral equation as
v(t) = etL +
∫ t
0
e(t−s)LF (vp(s))ds , Ψv(t). (A.3)
and seek a fixed point of the operator Ψ on the following set of functions:
X = C 1b (R,RN ) ,
{
v ∈ C 1(R,RN ) | v, vp bounded
}
equipped with the norm
‖v‖X , ‖v‖∞ + ‖vp‖∞ .
We set Y , Cb. Note that X and Y are Banach spaces and the semi-group etL associated with the
Laplace operator is strongly continuous on X, sends Y on X and satisfies∥∥etL∥∥
L (Y,X) ≤ Ct−γ
for some C > 0, γ < 1 and t ≤ 1. Furthermore, the nonlinearity F is locally Lipschitz and
belongs to C∞. Indeed, the map a 7→ X˙∗(a) is C∞, due to the implicit function theorem with
first derivative
∂
∂vp
X˙∗(vp) =
λ
(N + 1)g′(X˙∗(vp)− X˙∗(vp)g′′(X˙∗(vp))
where the denominator is positive due to Assumption 2.2. The cost function g is C∞ by assump-
tion. In particular, the assumptions of Proposition 15.1.1 in Taylor (1997) are satisfied.
The a-priori estimates of Proposition 3.1 yield that, if a solution v to (A.1) exists, it is bounded
in the sense ‖v‖X ≤ K. Therefore, we define
XK , {v ∈ X | ‖v‖X ≤ K}
and choosing K large enough we may assume that the initial condition satisfies H ∈ XK .
We are now ready to prove existence and uniqueness of a solution to (A.3). Proposition 15.1.1
in Taylor (1997) gives a solution for a small time horizon [0, τ ], with τ > 0 specified below. We
apply his argument recursively to extend the solution to [0, T ].
21
Proposition A.1. There is τ > 0 such that for each n ∈ N0, the PDE (A.3) with initial condition
(A.2) admits a unique classical, bounded solution in XK on the time horizon [0, nτ ∧ T ]. This
solution coincides with the value function.
Proof. 1. For n = 0, there is nothing to prove. Pick n ∈ N such that nτ < T . By induction,
we can assume that there is a solution v(n) ∈ XK on the time horizon [0, nτ ]. In particular,
the initial condition for the next recursion step h(n) , v(n)(nτ) is in XK .
2. Fix δ > 0. We construct a short time solution on the following set of functions:
Z(n+1) ,
{
v ∈ C ([nτ, (n+ 1)τ ],X) | v(nτ) = h(n),
∥∥∥u(t)− h(n)∥∥∥
X
≤ δ ∀t
}
.
To this end, we first show that Ψ : Z(n+1) → Z(n+1) is a contraction, if τ > 0 is chosen small
enough.
For this, let τ1 be small enough such that for t ≤ τ1 and any v ∈ XK we have∥∥etLv − v∥∥X ≤ 12δ.
Here we used that etL is a continuous semigroup and ‖v‖X ≤ K. In particular, for v = h(n):∥∥∥etLh(n) − h(n)∥∥∥
X
≤ 1
2
δ.
For v ∈ Z(n+1), the derivative vp is uniformly bounded in the sense ‖vp‖∞ ≤
∥∥h(n)∥∥X + δ ≤
K + δ. Hence, we only evaluate F on compact sets. By assumption, F is locally Lipschitz.
In particular, F is Lipschitz on compact sets. In other words, there is a constant K1 such
that for any v, w ∈ Z(n+1) we have
‖F (vp)− F (wp)‖Y ≤ K1 ‖v − w‖X
This implies, for w = h(n)
‖F (vp)‖Y ≤
∥∥∥F (h(n)p )∥∥∥Y +K1 ∥∥∥v − h(n)∥∥∥X
≤ K +K1δ
, K2.
This, together with the boundedness assumption on etL, yields∥∥∥∥∫ t
nτ
e(t−y)LF (vp(y))dy
∥∥∥∥
X
≤ t∥∥etL∥∥ sup
nτ≤y≤t
‖F (vp(y))‖Y
≤ t1−γCK2.
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This quantity is ≤ 12δ if t ≤ τ2 ,
(
δ
2CK2
) 1
1−γ
.
Finally, it follows that for v ∈ Z(n+1) we have∥∥∥Ψv − h(n)∥∥∥
X
≤
∥∥∥etLh(n) − h(n)∥∥∥
X
+
∥∥∥∥∫ t
nτ
e(t−y)LF (vp(y))dy
∥∥∥∥
X
≤ 1
2
δ +
1
2
δ = δ.
This shows that Ψ maps Z(n+1) into itself.
It remains to show that Ψ is a contraction. Let v, w ∈ Z(n+1). Then
‖Ψv(t)−Ψw(t)‖X =
∥∥∥∥∫ t
nτ
e(t−y)L [F (vp(y))− F (wp(y))] dy
∥∥∥∥
X
≤ t∥∥etL∥∥ sup
nτ≤y≤t
‖F (vp(y))− F (wp(y))‖Y
≤ t1−γCK2 sup
nτ≤y≤t
‖v(y)− w(y)‖X
The quantity t1−γCK2 is ≤ 12 if t ≤ τ3 ,
(
1
2CK2
) 1
1−γ
. This proofs that Ψ is a contraction
in Z(n+1), if τ is small in the sense
0 < τ , min{τ1, τ2, τ3}.
Note that the time step τ does not depend on n. It is the same in every recursion step.
3. It follows that Ψ has a unique fix point v in Z(n+1). In other words, we constructed a
function v ∈ C ([nτ, (n + 1)τ ],X) = C 0,1[nτ, (n + 1)τ ] which solves the PDE (A.3) with
initial condition v(s) = h(n) = v(n)(nτ) on the time interval [nτ, (n+ 1)τ ].
This solution is actually in C 1,2
(
(nτ, (n+ 1)τ ]× R,RN), due to Proposition 15.1.2 in Taylor
(1997). Furthermore, v is bounded by construction. Indeed, ‖v‖∞ ≤
∥∥h(n)∥∥X + δ ≤ K + δ.
We define the new solution as
v(n+1) , v(n)1{0≤t≤nτ} + v1{nτ<t≤(n+1)τ}.
By construction, v(n+1) solves (A.3) on the time horizon [0, (n+ 1)τ ] and is bounded and in
C 1,2. Hence, we can apply the Verification Theorem IV.3.1 from Fleming & Soner (1993),
which yields that v(n+1) coincides with the vector of value functions (up to time reversal and
an exponential transformation, if αj > 0). The a priori estimate in Proposition 3.1 yields
that v(n+1) ∈ XK . In particular,
∥∥v(n+1)((n+ 1)τ)∥∥X ≤ K, which is necessary for the next
recursion step.
This completes the proof.
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